It has been debated whether quantum mechanics and special relativity are compatible and whether there is a preferred Lorentz frame if they are incompatible. Bell’s theorem is an important cornerstone, but it does not give us a definite answer due to the existence of supplementary assumptions or theoretical loopholes; there are unitary quantum theories which evade Bell’s theorem.
In recent years, there has been stimulating discussion about superobservers, which might help settle the important issue of whether unitary quantum theories are compatible with special relativity. This online workshop aims to highlight the existing debates and address the controversies.
Workshop Date: Thursday, August 1, 2019 to Sunday, September 1, 2019
Advisory Board: Lajos Diósi, Arthur Fine, Gordon N. Fleming, Olival Freire Jr., Sheldon Goldstein, Robert B. Griffiths, Hans Halvorson, Richard A. Healey, Basil J. Hiley, Don Howard, Peter J. Lewis, Roger Penrose, and Maximilian Schlosshauer.
Based on the successful previous workshops, this online workshop will be more self-organized. Every participant, after logging in, may create a topic in the workshop forum on his own, which gives a concise introduction to his ideas to be discussed. Then other participants can leave comments and participate in the discussions by text chat in the forum.
All IJQF members are welcome.
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Bell inequalities based on the logic of plausible reasoning
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In https://arxiv.org/abs/1712.04334 I show that the Bell inequalities follow as well from the logic of plausible reasoning also named the objective Bayesian interpretation of probability theory.
Conceptually, in the objective Bayesian interpretation of probability, it is an extension of logic for the case of plausible reasoning. The axioms are, essentially, consistency requirements that different ways of argumentation should give the same results about the plausibility of some claim. So, the rules of probability theory obtain a quite different status, as rules of reasoning. In the frequency interpretation, they are some sort of frequencies we observe, and could be reasonably questioned, or empirically falsified or so, something which makes no sense for rules of reasoning.
Technically, there was yet a minor technical difference between Kolmogorovian probability and the objective Bayesian interpretation, but it was easy to close, thus the logic of plausible reasoning now contains the full Kolmogorovian probability theory. But in this case, the key formula
\[ E(AB|a,b) = \int A(a,b,l)B(a,b,l)\rho(a,b,l)dl \]
which is considered to describe something nontrivial, like “realism”, becomes a formula of logic. It remains to get rid of a,b in \(\rho\) (superdeterminism), which appears a consequence of plausible reasoning too (logical independence: we have no information which suggests a dependence, thus, we have to assume independence) and the dependence of A on b resp. B of A, which is Einstein causality. So, the physically nontrivial assumption is only Einstein causality.
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